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PARADES OF HORRIBLES, CIRCLES OF HELL:
ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PUBLICATION CONTROVERSY

David S. Caudill

“...Abandon every hope, all you who enter.”
Dante, Inferno, Canto III: 91

I. INTRODUCTION: PARADES OF HORRIBLES

Rhetorical recourse to a “parade of horribles” need not have a pejorative connotation. In
policy debates, for example, opponents and proponents of a new rule or regulation typically rely
on predictions of the adverse effects of accepting or rejecting, respectively, the proposal.
Sometimes the benefits of a particular course of action—whether to change or to keep a law—
will outweigh the realistically identified burdens. Nevertheless, in the controversy surrounding
proposed Rule 32.12 and publication practices generally, many suspect that the dueling parades
of horribles are exaggerated. Indeed, as Professor Stephen Barnett points out, if proposed Rule
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THE DIVINE COMEDY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI, vol. 1, INFERNO 55 (ed. & trans. Robert M. Durling,
1996).
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Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled “Citing Judicial Dispositions,” is
a proposed amendment published for comment in August 2003 by the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules; if adopted, the rule would allow citation to unpublished opinions in every
federal circuit.
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32.1 would be as disastrous as its opponents claim, then the majority of federal circuits would be
rushing to prohibit citation of unpublished opinions in their own rules;3 conversely, if prohibiting
citation of unpublished opinions was as problematic as the proponents of Rule 32.1 claim, then
the four circuits that prohibit citation would embrace the salvation offered by Rule 32.1 Since
both “systems” of citation are currently in place, both sides in the Rule 32.1 debate can claim
that the other side has no evidence to support its predictive parade of horribles. As to the broader
but related issues of whether current publication practices are pragmatically necessary or
extremely troubling, both sides in that debate also enlist parades of horribles (that are likewise
susceptible to charges of exaggeration).4 Significantly, however, supporters of such practices as
unpublication and depublication predict a dire situation if it were otherwise, while critics seek to
disclose the hidden parade of horribles that now exist. Finally, when defenders of no-citation
rules and the practice of writing unpublished opinions respond, they unwittingly create a parade
of horribles by virtue of their justificatory revelations. Lots of parades here, so let me explain.

The first parade of horribles, offered in support of Rule 32.1, includes (i) the hardships on
attorneys who have to figure out the conflicting citation rules in each circuit; (ii) First
Amendment and prior restraint concerns (“no-citation rules...are profoundly antithetical to
American values”5); (iii) the dissonance between no-citation rules and the fact that unpublished

3

See The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial Conference Rule-Making, and
Federal Public Defenders, in this symposium,
WASH. & LEE L. REV. _____ (2005).

4

Regarding pragmatic necessities, see generally Boyce F. Martin, In Defense of Unpublished
Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 177 (1999); regarding the extremely troubling aspects of current
publication practices, see generally Penelope J. Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of
Private Judging in U.S. Courts, 56 STAN L. REV. 1435 (2004).

5

See Memorandum from Patrick Schiltz to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, March 18,
2004, at 46 (discussing arguments for adopting Rule 32.1).
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opinions are available, insightful, used by attorneys, and cited by judges; (iv) arbitrariness and
injustice because like cases may not be treated alike; (v) lack of judicial accountability and loss
of public confidence in the judiciary; and (vi) the appearance—perhaps reality—that wealthy
litigants get published opinions while the poor do not.6

If that parade appears to you as

exaggerated, then—with apologies to comedian Jeff Foxworthy7—you may be an opponent of
Rule 32.1

The second parade of horribles, offered by opponents of Rule 32.1 is even bigger, reflecting
both the benign fact that opposition to a controversial proposal is traditionally more likely than
support,8 and the unseemly fact that the opposition to Rule 32.1 was an organized campaign—
repetitive, even identical, comments were sent to the Committee, and about 90% of the 500+
comments received were opposed.9 That parade of horribles included the predictions (i) that
judges will be misled by illegitimate citation of unpublished opinions; (ii) that judges would be
overwhelmed by the duty to write better unpublished opinions, and consequently have less time
to write published opinions, thereby rendering the (actual!) law less clear, thus leading to more
litigation and even greater demands on judges’ time, all of which will result in more one-line
dispositions; (iii) the body of case law would be (somewhat contradictorily, given the previous
6

See id. at 46-58.

7

For those readers unfamiliar with this (Southern) cultural reference, Jeff Foxworthy, star of the
current television show “Blue Collar TV” (Warner Bros.), became famous in the 1990’s with his
“You might be a redneck...” routine. See, e.g., The Best of Jeff Foxworthy: Double Wide, Single
Minded (CD released Sept. 2, 2003, Warner Bros. Records, Nashville) (“If you’ve ever cut your
grass and found a car, you might be a redneck”).

8

See Barnett, supra note 3, at ____, quoting Judge Levi, Chair of the Standing Committee on
Rules, Transcript at Hearing, April 13, 2004, p. 121 (“It’s quite typical in these rules matters that
the overwhelming letters, particularly on a controversial matter, will be opposed. There’s almost
a tradition of that.”).

9

See Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2.
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prediction) vastly increased, imposing a hardship on attorneys; and (iv) parties will have to wait
longer for judicial resolution, which costs money and discriminates against the poor.10

In the broader debate over publication practices generally, the parades of horribles offered by
defenders and critics overlap somewhat with the two Rule 32.1 parades. Defenders point to the
crises that led to current practices, including overwhelming precedent, technological and storage
problems and inefficiencies, and increasing judicial workload; critics highlight the sacrifice of
principled decisionmaking, the loss of judicial legitimacy, compromises of transparency and
accountability, an increased inconsistency or lack of uniformity, the advantaging of repeatplayers and corresponding subordination of the poor and marginalized.11

A fifth and final parade of horribles, however, arises from these debates almost in reverse or
by accident—I refer here to the response by Judge Kozinski to criticism of the no-citation rule,
which response also defends the practice of unpublication as a necessity.12 Judge Kozinski’s

10

See Memorandum, supra note 5, at 34-46. For an argument that this parade of horribles is
exaggerated, see Stephen R. Barnett, “In Support of Proposed Federal Rule of Procedure 32.1: A
reply to Judge Kozinsky”, THE FED. LAWYER, Nov/Dec 2004, at 32-37.

11

See Martin, supra note 4, at 180 (prior to defending the necessity of unpublication practices,
Judge Martin catalogues some of the criticisms to which he responds: “loss of precedent...;
sloppy decisions...; lack of uniformity...; difficulty of higher court review...; unfairness to litigants
[who] deserve published opinions; less judicial accountability...; less predictability...”); see also
Pether, supra note 4, at 1439-41:
[T]he three main practices of private judging developed in the U.S.
Courts—contemporary unpublication, depublication, and stipulated
withdrawal—...sacrifice principled decisionmaking [and] imperil the
legitimacy of the judicial system and thus the rule of law.... [T]here is
credible evidence of the tendency for the practices of private judging to
corrupt the operation of the courts and the administration of justice....

12

See Jan. 16, 2004 letter to Hon. Samuel A. Alito, Chair of the Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, regarding Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1.
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famous January 16, 2004 letter to Judge Alito, Chair of the Rules Committee, was intended to
comfort the offended by offering a reality-check, an insider’s view of why designating some
opinions as unpublished was not a horror to be feared. In the process of his explanation,
however, Judge Kozinski horrified many readers. Unpublished opinions are simply “not safe as
precedent” given “the press of our cases”; many such “cases are badly briefed,” and quite “often,
there is a severe disparity in the quality of the lawyering between the parties”; and “unpublished
dispositions—unlike opinions—are often drafted entirely by law clerks and staff attorneys”13—
cold comfort, one might say, and hardly a picture of reassurance to litigants that the status quo
needs no serious reform.

In his similar testimony before the House, according to one scholar, Judge Kozinski
heretically argued that if unpublished

opinions were citable, the judges...might have “to pay much closer
attention to their precise wording,” [or] “agree on the precise
reasoning,” while the judges who dissent might have to make that
fact known [and] might “have to pay much closer attention” to the
decisions written by their colleagues....
Judge Kozinski’s
rationalizations...are not only outrageous, but in my view violate
the fundamental principles of the...Code of Judicial conduct.14
Moreover, the very notion that unpublished opinions are written quickly by court staff or law
clerks is (if you put yourself in the position of an anxious litigant on appeal) scandalous...or not,
depending on your position in the publication controversy, and on which parades of horribles
13

See id. at 4-6.

14

Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an Abdication of
Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.1215, 1222 (quoting Judge Kozinski’s testimony, Hearing
on Unpublished Judicial Opinions Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, June 27, 2002, 107th Cong., available at:
www.house.gov/judiciary/kozinski062702.htm).
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you think are exaggerated.

The purpose of this article is to explore some of the ethical dimensions of the publication
controversy. As I will show, there are different types of ethical challenges or dilemmas for
lawyers and judges in each of the several “levels” of the controversy. In terms of Dante’s
Inferno, lawyers and judges are condemned to different fates depending on the “circle of hell” in
which they find themselves. Recall that in the structure of Dante’s hell, occupants of different
levels suffer differently, with relatively little suffering in the first circle of hell, but significantly
more suffering in the lower circles; indeed, the suffering increases at each level in proportion to
the seriousness of the sin being punished. In my first circle of hell, I identify ethical problems
created by no-citation rules; in the second circle of hell, I identify ethical problems that arise
from the current context of publication practices generally; the third circle of hell represents what
has been called the trend toward privatization of law, or “the end of law” as we know it, wherein
a different set of ethical dimensions can be identified. It is my hope that this taxonomy helps
explain why the heated controversy over Rule 32.1—which appears to some to be a tempest in a
teapot or “Much Ado About Little”15—is so polarizing and important. In short, the Rule 32.1
debate represents or signifies a much deeper problem.

II. THE RULE AGAINST CITATION: THE FIRST CIRCLE OF HELL

Anyone who states that lawyers and judges have a common
understanding of how to handle unpublished opinions is either

15

See Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm und Drang Over the Citation
of Unpublished Opinions, in this symposium, _______ WASH. & LEE L. REV. ______ (2005).
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misinformed or less than candid.16
Comparatively speaking, the first circle of hell (Limbo) in Dante’s Inferno is not that bad.
For those virtuous unbelievers at this level who died unbaptized or otherwise preceded Christ,
there is no physical suffering, but there is mental anguish in the knowledge that one will never
see Him.17 Homer and Ovid, Socrates and Plato, Democritus and Euclid, among others, are
suspended in Limbo, many of whom live in a “noble castle” surrounded “by a lovely stream.”18

Likewise, the ethical dilemmas faced by attorneys because of no-citation rules are indirect
and somewhat speculative.

For example, the variation across circuits as to citation of

unpublished opinions “means that petitioners face sanctions if they cite unpublished cases in
certain circuits, yet risk negligence if they fail to do so in others.”19 That risk exists throughout

16

17

Public Comment 03-AP-432, Proposed Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
quoted in memorandum from Patrick Schiltz to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, supra
note 2, at 94.
See INFERNO, supra note 1, at 72 (Canto IV: 31-43):
My good master [Virgil] said to me: “You do not ask what spirits you
see? Now I wish you to know, before you walk further,
that they did not sin; and if they have merits, it is not enough, because
they did not receive baptism, which is the gateway to the faith that you
believe.
And if they lived before Christianity, they did not adore God as was
needful: and of this kind am I myself.
Because of such defects, not for any other wickedness, we are lost, and
only so far harmed that without hope we live in desire.”

18

See id. at 75-77. “We came to the foot of a noble castle, seven times encircled by high walls,
defended all around by a lovely stream.” Id. at 75 (Canto IV: 106-108).

19

See David S. Law, “Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: An Empirical Investigation of Ideology and
Publication on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,” mss. at 3, forthcoming in
CINCINNATI L. REV.
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the law, and therefore seems minimal. Indeed, Judge Kozinski remarks that the “argument that
lawyers have difficulty figuring out the applicable rule doesn’t pass the straight-face test.”20 A
competent attorney will follow the applicable rules. As if that aphorism needed clarification, the
A.B.A. in 1994 issued a formal ethics opinion concerning the ethical propriety of citing an
unpublished opinion in a no-citation jurisdiction. Model Rule 3.4(c) would be violated, for
“knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal,” and creative attempts to
circumvent the prohibition—by calling the court’s attention to a prior decision for whatever use
the court might make of it—were condemned as well.21

A more significant risk, perhaps, is created by the choice attorneys face, with respect to
unpublished opinions, as to what constitutes competent research. Attorney rules of professional
conduct require competence, diligence, good faith claims, and candor to the tribunal.22 If noncitable opinions are not precedential, but nevertheless represent prior decisions of a court, how
are they to be used?

Consider a lawyer counseling a client concerning a proposed
course of action. If the only legal authority is a non-citable case
that permits the conduct, what advice can a lawyer properly give?
Or what if the non-citable opinion forbids the conduct? Can the
lawyer tell the client that he or she is safe to proceed because an
adversary could not cite a case that has prohibited it? What if,
during litigation, a lawyer asserts that an old precedent has never
been followed? If the case has in fact been followed many times,
albeit in un-citable opinions [that] merely “restate” the law, is his
or her adversary expected to remain mute and deprive the court of
information helpful in evaluating...the case? These scenarios
20

See Jan. 16, 2004 letter, supra note 12, at 18.

21

See A.B.A. Formal Ethics Opinion 94-386R, quoting the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 3.4(c).

22

See A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.1 & 3.3.
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present awkward ethical problems.23
In another formulation, the president of the Los Angeles County Bar Association recently
remarked:

One thing we don’t know is what happens to a lawyer who misses
nonpublished cases. Some disappointed client might sue for
malpractice.... It’s not that people don’t look at unpublished
opinions now; they do. The difference is the priority you have to
give them.24
Significantly, the problems of legal research—deciding what to read, how much weight to give
to unpublished opinions, and what to use—persist regardless of no-citation rules. Both sides in
the Rule 32.1 debate take the moral high ground and parade out the hardships on attorneys
created by their opponent’s position. Rule 32.1 supposedly increases the burdens of research,
because if unpublished “opinions were published and citable, lawyers would have to search them
to confirm that nothing useful was in them, thereby increasing the cost of legal research.”

25

Similarly, no-citation rules supposedly deprive attorneys of potentially useful insights and
information from unpublished opinions—advocates are handicapped by not being able to cite a
case with facts very similar to their own.26 Giving the benefit of the doubt to the proponents of
such arguments, these hardships tend to cancel each other out—there will be hardships under

23

David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwartz, The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1133, 1157 (2002).

24

See Stephanie Francis Ward, “Giving Their Opinions: Committee Backs Rule Allowing Lawyers
to Cite Unpublished Decisions,” ABA JOURNAL e-report, April 23, 2004.

25

See J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 433, 492
(1994).

26

See Memorandum, supra note 5, at 47-48.
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either system of citation. (Of course, the proponents of Rule 32.1 view the argument of Rule
32.1 critics with suspicion—attorneys already research unpublished opinions “so as to be able to
advise clients about the legality of their conduct, predict the outcome of litigation, and get ideas
about how to frame and argue issues before the court”;27 conversely, opponents of Rule 32.1
claim that allowing citation to an opinion that was likely written by a staff attorney (as if it
represents the view of the court) “is a particularly subtle and insidious form of fraud,” made
possible by Rule 32.1’s creation of “a veritable amusement park for lawyers found of playing
games” (who would use some of the “zillion” unpublished opinions that are “thin on the facts,
and written in loose, sloppy language”).28) Attorneys have learned to deal with whatever system
in which they work, and they do not seem to be forced into acting unethically—incompetently,
dishonestly, or undiligently—in either system. A more serious set of problems is associated with
the question of what to do with unpublished opinions—what to read, use, and value. These
ethical dilemmas are a product of nonpublication practices generally, in every jurisdiction.

Professor Fox, for example, argues that “any interference with my ability to be as zealous
and effective an advocate as I can be,” such as no-citation rules, is frustrating:

Here I am providing the court with all the reasons why my client
should prevail, [bringing] anything to the attention of the court that
I think might be persuasive.... but the one thing I cannot cite is an
unpublished opinion written by real judges who sat on the very
court before whom I appear that involved real litigants in a real
dispute that was actually decided using the English language as a
way of informing the litigants how the court reached it decision.29
27

See id. at 58.

28

See Jan. 16, 2004 letter, supra note 12, at 7, 21.

29

See Fox, supra note 14, at 1218; see also A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL Conduct,
Rule 1.3 (diligence requires taking all measures to help a client).
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The problem, of course, is that the unpublished opinion may not have been written by real
judges, and it may not reflect how the real judges reached a decision, because of current
publication practices. And those practices, discussed in the next section, are really what Fox is
“railing against.”30

III. PUBLICATION PRACTICES: THE SECOND CIRCLE OF HELL

And I came to a place where no light shines.
Dante, Inferno, Canto IV:15131

In the second circle of hell, Dante first confronts those who are punished for their sins, and
the scene is grim—“much weeping assails” him, “all light is silent,” and the “infernal whirlwind,
which never rests, drives the spirits before its violence; turning and striking, it tortures them.”32
Dante is here supposed to learn “to despise the lustful because they blaspheme Divine Justice
which has placed them there,”33 but he fails the test and sympathizes with them (eventually
fainting, overcome with pity).34

Moreover, Dante alludes to a certain solidarity or

companionship as the sinners in the second circle of hell weather an infernal storm—while one
30

See id. at 1218 (Fox “rail[s] against” Rule 32.1 as an “interference” with his ability to be a
“zealous and effective advocate”).

31

See INFERNO, supra note 1, at 79.

32

See id. at 88-89 (Canto V: 26-27, 28, 31-33).

33

See DANTE’S INFERNO: THE INDIANA CRITICAL EDITION 52 (trans. & ed. Mark Musa, 1995)
(translator’s notes to Canto V).
34

See INFERNO, supra note 1, at 93 (“Francesca, your sufferings make me sad and piteous to tears,”
Canto V: 116-17; “...for pity I fainted as if I were dying,” Canto V: 140).
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spirit speaks, the other weeps.35 They do not suffer alone.

The sense that we’re-all-in-the-same-boat also characterizes the history of publication
practices, which transcends the Rule 32.1 debate by implicating all judges and lawyers. A
dilemma for lawyers arises because they have to guess about the potential authority and value of
unpublished opinions—they might reflect the court’s opinion, but they might not.

If in fact judges reach the same result, but for different reasons, are
not the litigants—if not the entire world—absolutely entitled to
know that fact? Embedded in that undisclosed difference is a real
opportunity for the party who loses the appeal to seek further
review. The failure to agree on the principle that supports the
result—if it were disclosed...—could demonstrate how tenuous the
result really is....36
How is it possible to be competent, in the system we learned to predict the outcome of
controversies, if the cases most like ours have an unusually indeterminate status? On the other
hand, this is just an ethical strain, since we’re all in the same boat. The competence and
diligence required by the rules of professional conduct are interpreted according to the
conventions and practices of most lawyers, so it would be difficult to identify a violation on the
basis of a “guess” about the status if an unpublished opinion.

A different set of ethical dilemmas, however arises for the judiciary in the era of unpublished
opinions.

35

See id., Canto V: 139.

36

Fox, supra note 14, at 1223.
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First, the Code [of Judicial Conduct] tells judges that they shall
perform their duties “diligently”.... [A] lawyer who failed to
perform assiduously because he was to busy would have that
excuse fall on deaf ears.... [D]oesn’t that mean that judges should
not facilitate underfunding of the judiciary by delivering second
class justice.
Second, judges are to be “faithful to the law”.... [J]udges have
no greater calling than to decide cases fairly, impartially,
consistently, and with a full explanation to the parties of the basis
for the decision....
Third, judges are admonished to maintain “professional
competence”.... [Doesn’t] a judge who fails to write opinions with
sufficient clarity of language and adequate consideration of the
opinions precedential value [violate] the obligation of
competence?37
These arguments, made by Professor Fox in the context of his criticism of no-citation rules,
apply equally to the broader practice of unpublication.

Of course, the practice of issuing

unpublished opinions is a judicial convention—a systematic problem not likely to lead to
sanctions.

Nevertheless, a judge is arguably forced, by an overwhelming workload, to

compromise the ideals set forth in the Code of Judicial Conduct.

But there is an even broader problem, with ethical implications for the profession. The
practice of issuing unpublished opinions is symptomatic of the end or privatization of law in
some fields of practice.

IV. PRIVATIZATION: THE THIRD CIRCLE OF HELL

Gluttony...has none of the potential charm of lust. [In the third
37

Id. at 1225; see Canon 3, A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, regarding diligence (“A Judge
Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office...Diligently”); regarding competence and being
faithful to the law, see Canon 3(B)(2) (“A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it”).
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circle,] it is punished by eternal groveling in mire and filth.
Whereas lust has the possibility of companionship, here each is
alone in his degradation, cold and miserable.38

With respect to the end of law, we are not all in the same boat. There is no rule or
nationwide practice of privatizing law, but it happens in some fields of law—so it lacks the
charm of universality. For example, Professor Carr and attorney Michael Jencks highlight the
privatization of dispute resolution in the field of business law. While the common law of
reported decisions traditionally developed “rules for allocating risk and deciding business and
commercial disputes”, that system has been weakened by alternative dispute resolution (and
judicial support of such privatization), managerial judging, the bureaucratization of the judiciary,
and “the increased use of vacatur, selective publication and the adoption of no-citation rules,
depublication, filings under seal and confidential settlements.”39

As to the ethical dimensions of privatization, Diane Karpman warns that California’s
Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act could together create “a future
without reported decisions involving legal malpractice”:

If every California lawyer included a binding arbitration clause for
client claims, public decisional law regarding legal malpractice
would disappear.
...Once the [fee arbitration] “experience” is over, the client is
back in binding arbitration of the remaining claims. Nothing
involving attorney malpractice need see the light of day.40
38

39

40

Seth Zimmerman, commentary on his translation of Dante’s Inferno, available at
http://home.earthlink.net/ zimls/summaries.html*6
Chris Carr & Michael Jencks, The Privatization of Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution:
A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L. J. 183, 185, 189 (2000).
Diane Karpman, , “Take a close look at binding arbitration,” CALIF. B.J., June 2004, at 16.
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Some “smart practitioners,” therefore, may avoid the publicity of “publicity litigated claims of
negligence.”41

Professor Judith Resnik suggests that alongside the 20th century trend toward increased
“access to and reliance on adjudicatory” sites, “new doctrines and norms...support several kinds
of ‘alternatives’, many of which lack adjudication’s transparency. The result is diminished
reliance on and support for public processes.”42

With “vanishing trials” comes fewer adjudicatory moments for the
public to witness.... [C]ourt-based ADR processes often involve
decisions by state-empowered actors who influence outcomes
through informal discussions with lawyers and litigants that are
aimed at “nudging” them to settlement. Some of those settlements
are “sealed,” and sometimes those agreements also put materials
produced by discovery under wraps....
[The concurrent, conflicting trend toward increased access to
adjudicatory sites] may also render adjudication obsolete, as its
specificity becomes uncomfortable when it produces visible
disparities across similarly situated individuals....43
One can imagine numerous areas of law where the anonymity of alternative dispute resolution
would be appreciated (by those accused) and troubling (by those wronged)—civil rights,
consumer protection, employment discrimination, and so forth.

For my purposes, attorney

malpractice and claims of ethical violations are paradigms of these phenomena.

41

See id.

42

Procedure’s Projects, 23 CIV. JUSTICE Q. 273, 273 (2004).

43

Id. at 302-03.
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Private

adjudication or settlement of such disputes hinders the development of norms and guidelines
(through precedent), and thereby increases the risk of inconsistent outcomes and differential
treatment of like parties.

The law governing lawyers is thereby impoverished, an ethical

“burden” of sorts. But this is only part of the larger problem of the ethical burden on lawyers
who inherit an impoverished body of precedent in any area of law—they cannot predict
outcomes and advise clients with confidence.

Professors Perschbacher and Bassett call this privatization trend the “end of law,” the
unintended result of settlement process and their encouragement, arbitration and private judging,
unpublished opinions, deferential standards of review, the “harmless error” doctrine, minimalist
judicial “standards” (rather than “rules”), memorandum dispositions, fewer oral arguments, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s avoidance devices, vacatur, depublication, and stipulated reversal.44
While the “vanishing trial” is an obvious phenomenon, less obvious is that

Law in the normative sense is vanishing—veiled by procedures
that hide law from view and eradicated by procedures that
eliminate existing law. The result of these procedures is privatized
law, distorted norms, diminished case resolution and explanation,
and loss of the full landscape of law.45
Viewing these developments, some people are astonished—but some commentators are
astonished that anyone would be astonished—of course the trial is disappearing, and the only
surprise is that anyone familiar with law would be surprised.46

44

See generally Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 BOSTON U.L. REV.
1 (2004).

45

Id. at 62.

46

See Resnik, supra note 42, at 283. Critics of adversarial adjudication
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V. CONCLUSION: DISCOURSES OF ASTONISHMENT

I agree with those opponents of Rule 32.1 who ask, in essence:
“What’s the big deal? What’s the problem crying and for a
solution? Are no-citation rules really inflicting a lot of harm on a
lot of people?”47
Even though I clerked for a federal court of appeals, practiced law in two different states,
and currently teach in a law school, I was astonished to hear how many judicial opinions are
designated “not for publication.” Yet the controversy over unpublished opinions is characterized
by a discourse of astonishment—most judges seem to be astonished that I would be so naive.
When those in the judiciary explain their workload and situation, as Judge Kozinski did, critics
are astonished by their calm admission that unpublished opinions are “written in loose, sloppy
language” by law clerks.48 Judges are, in turn “baffled by” concerns about a body of secret law,
using unpublished opinions to circumvent the law, or giving some parties special treatment.49

argue that adversary trials require extravagant investments of resources
to yield flawed conclusions. At the macro-level, the complaint is that
“excessive adversarial legalism” is a drain on economic productivity.
Others dislike adjudication’s formalism that, they argue, promotes
unnecessarily prolonged conflicts. They propose more user-friendly, less
adversarial processes.... Such commentators believe that processes such
as mediation and arbitration are more justice-generative than is
adjudication.

Id.
47

See Memorandum, supra note 5, at 90.

48

See Jan. 16, 2004 letter, supra note 12, at 4, 21.

49

See id. at 7.
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With respect to Rule 32.1, Patrick Schiltz seems astonished that the controversy is so intense,50
and Steven Barnett is astonished that Schiltz recognizes the virtues of Rule 32.1 but recommends
no action at this time.51 Everyone is shocked.

Contrary to those who think that the publication controversy is not worth all the time and
effort spent criticizing and defending current judicial practices, this is a big deal. Ethically, it
implicates the ability of lawyers and judges to do their jobs competently. While some lawyers
may not consider no-citation rules a huge problem, and while they may simply learn to live with
the conventions of nonpublication and privatization, the Rule 32.1 controversy represents, and
reveals, the problematic aspect of all of these phenomena—we do not have a principled and
transparent system of justice wherein judges are responsible for creating rules and are
accountable for inconsistencies. If that sounds exaggerated, you might be an apologist for the
status quo.

50

See Memorandum, supra note 5, at 89 (“For the most part, the advisory committees identify
technical problems and propose uncontroversial solutions.... As a result, objections to proposed rules
are usually neither many nor passionate”), 90 (“Rule 32.1 is one of those rare proposals that is highly
controversial”).
51

See id. at 95 (Professor Barnett “does not share the committee’s concern that judges who oppose
Rule 32.1 will try to undermine it by imposing restrictions on the citation of unpublished
opinions....”).
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